A college admissions clearinghouse
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A college admissions clearinghouse
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91540
author: M. Bumin Yenmez
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2019-01-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7001752
zbMATH Keywords: college admissions
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many matching
zbMATH Keywords: path independence
zbMATH Keywords: substitutability
zbMATH Keywords: modification
zbMATH Keywords: law of aggregate demand
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.05.010
OpenAlex ID: W2803995838
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Wikidata QID: Q129785493
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001752