A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
zbMATH Open document ID: 1250.91017
author: Marie Laclau
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-11-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
zbMATH DE Number: 6102549
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: networks
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
zbMATH Keywords: communication protocols
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2012.08.008
OpenAlex ID: W2000189373
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2012.08.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6102549