The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk'' in bargaining among coalitions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk'' in bargaining among coalitions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1251.91036
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2012-11-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1147
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6103635
zbMATH Keywords: coalitions
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: weighted Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: Harsanyi paradox
author: Juan J. Vidal-Puga
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1996004303
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.05.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6103635