On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 1261.91019
author: Onur Kesten
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-11-26T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/On_Two_Kinds_of_Manipulation_for_School_Choice_Problems/6707180
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 6110411
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: student-optimal stable mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: top trading cycles
zbMATH Keywords: Boston mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: acyclicity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2167624657
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-011-0618-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6110411