Aggregate risk sharing and equivalent financial mechanisms in an endowment economy of incomplete participation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Aggregate risk sharing and equivalent financial mechanisms in an endowment economy of incomplete participation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1091.91038
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2005-02-11T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper examines risk-sharing arrangements associated with two concepts of Pareto optimality: conditional and equal treatment. It also studies how these arrangements are financed. It derives the Arrow-Debreu contingent claim prices under the assumption that there is a clearing house announcing prices such that excess supply and excess demand sum to zero in each state and time period. The clearing house essentially transfers funds from young agents to old agents. The results are related to equivalence results in Chamley and Polemarcharkis (1984), Weiss (1980), and Wallace (1981).
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 2133546
zbMATH Keywords: Dynamic inefficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Aggregate risk sharing
zbMATH Keywords: Overlapping generations.
author: Pamela A. Labadie
reviewed by: E. S. W. Shiu
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-004-0477-5
OpenAlex ID: W4253307125
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-004-0477-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2133546