Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
zbMATH Open document ID: 1090.91023
author: Murat R. Sertel
author: M. Remzi Sanver
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2005-02-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 2133607
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-003-0218-x
OpenAlex ID: W1997123971
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-003-0218-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2133607