Stability and voting by committees with exit
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability and voting by committees with exit
zbMATH Open document ID: 1090.91017
author: Dolors Berga
author: G. Bergantiños
author: Jordi Massó
author: Alejandro Neme
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2005-02-11T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15137
review text: The problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates is studied. The possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society is explicitly considered. It is shown that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founders' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 2133616
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2172239408
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-003-0246-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2133616