Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories
zbMATH Open document ID: 1088.91022
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2005-02-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 2136720
zbMATH Keywords: Bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: Voting
author: Marek Mikolaj Kaminski
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2003.11.004
OpenAlex ID: W2163038160
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2003.11.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2136720