Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1101.91319
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00076-4
author: Biung-Ghi Ju
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2005-02-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 2136930
zbMATH Keywords: Efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Continuity
zbMATH Keywords: Veto-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Exchange economy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
cites work: On fixed point theorems and social choice paradoxes
cites work: Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
cites work: Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
cites work: Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
cites work: Aggregate Demand, Real National Income, and the Compensation Principle
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Q5668220
cites work: On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
cites work: Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
cites work: Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
cites work: Q4902563
cites work: Feasible and Continuous Implementation
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
cites work: Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
cites work: Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
cites work: Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
cites work: Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
cites work: The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
cites work: A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies
cites work: Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
cites work: A note on continuous social choice
full work available at URL: s0304-4068(03)00076-4
OpenAlex ID: W2148030170
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2136930