Stable matchings and preferences of couples
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable matchings and preferences of couples
zbMATH Open document ID: 1098.91092
author: Bettina Klaus
author: Flip Klijn
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2005-04-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 2160132
zbMATH Keywords: responsiveness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2004.04.006
OpenAlex ID: W2099790472
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2004.04.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2160132