When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1117.91396
author: Cheng Wang
author: Stephen Spear
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2005-05-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 2165236
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2004.02.008
OpenAlex ID: W2039626832
cites work: Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
cites work: Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2004.02.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2165236