Bargaining power in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining power in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1118.91020
author: Lars Peter Østerdal
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2005-06-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 2173521
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiation
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium concept
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: selection-consistent perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2004.07.001
OpenAlex ID: W1970629238
cites work: On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
cites work: Q3354616
cites work: Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
cites work: Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
cites work: Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
cites work: Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
cites work: Renegotiation in repeated games
cites work: On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
cites work: Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
cites work: Starting small and renegotiation
cites work: Starting small and commitment
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2004.07.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2173521