Testing threats in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Testing threats in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1118.91021
author: Ran Spiegler
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2005-06-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: refs4391749000000000445.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 2173594
zbMATH Keywords: solution concepts
zbMATH Keywords: justifiability
zbMATH Keywords: reciprocity
zbMATH Keywords: trigger strategies
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: Nash Equilibrium with Tests
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1963883220
cites work: Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
cites work: Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
cites work: Q3576736
cites work: Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games
cites work: Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2004.04.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2173594