Strategy-proof risk sharing
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof risk sharing
zbMATH Open document ID: 1118.91056
author: Biung-Ghi Ju
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-06-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 2173608
zbMATH Keywords: Efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Individual rationality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2004.02.004
OpenAlex ID: W1969049152
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2004.02.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2173608