Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91238
author: Christian Ewerhart
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6939415
zbMATH Keywords: Tullock contest
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: heterogeneous valuations
zbMATH Keywords: discrimination
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2017.05.012
OpenAlex ID: W2604951231
cites work: Asymmetric contests with general technologies
cites work: Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
cites work: Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
cites work: Q5323812
cites work: The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests
cites work: Accuracy in contests: players' perspective
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.05.012
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6939415