Replicator dynamics and evolutionary game of social tolerance: the role of neutral agents
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Replicator dynamics and evolutionary game of social tolerance: the role of neutral agents
zbMATH Open document ID: 1398.91081
author: Yingying Shi
author: Min Pan
author: Daiyan Peng
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6939454
zbMATH Keywords: replicator dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: tolerance
zbMATH Keywords: economic interaction model
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2017.07.005
OpenAlex ID: W2735229779
cites work: Economic interactions and social tolerance: a dynamic perspective
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.07.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6939454