Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91127
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-21T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25171
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 6940916
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: information
zbMATH Keywords: conflicting preferences
zbMATH Keywords: fractionalisation
author: Boris D. Ginzburg
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2592487726
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.02.033
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6940916