Multiparty evolutionary game model in coal mine safety management and its application
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Multiparty evolutionary game model in coal mine safety management and its application
zbMATH Open document ID: 1398.91076
DOI: 10.1155/2018/9620142
author: G. Richomme
published in: Complexity
publication date: 2018-09-27T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B50
zbMATH DE Number: 6944927
zbMATH Keywords: coal mine safety management
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game model
zbMATH Keywords: stability theory of dynamics system
zbMATH Keywords: phase diagram
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/9620142
OpenAlex ID: W2789680734
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Wikidata QID: Q130150749
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6944927