Electoral competition with strategic voters
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Electoral competition with strategic voters
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91134
author: Claudia Meroni
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-25T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: wp2017n7.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6943206
zbMATH Keywords: voting theory
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
zbMATH Keywords: electoral competition
zbMATH Keywords: power sharing
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2752062472
cites work: A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
cites work: Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.002
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6943206