Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91122
author: Hayrullah Dindar
author: Lainé, Jean
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6943264
zbMATH Keywords: representative democracy
zbMATH Keywords: vote pairing
zbMATH Keywords: group manipulation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2017.09.040
OpenAlex ID: W2761946271
cites work: On avoiding vote swapping
cites work: Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of coice
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
cites work: A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.040
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6943264