(Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 1416.91171
author: Theodoros M. Diasakos
author: Kostas Koufopoulos
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-10-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: YGAME2862main.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6952560
zbMATH Keywords: insurance market
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: interim incentive efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: neutral optimum
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3125009269
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Wikidata QID: Q129802449
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.04.007
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6952560