Evolutionary game analysis of the supervision behavior for public-private partnership projects with public participation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary game analysis of the supervision behavior for public-private partnership projects with public participation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91065
DOI: 10.1155/2016/1760837
author: Yu Wang
author: CongDong Li
author: Xiaoli Li
published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
publication date: 2018-10-12T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 6952845
Wikidata QID: Q59131048
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/1760837
OpenAlex ID: W2530878318
cites work: Evolutionary Games in Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6952845