Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals
zbMATH Open document ID: 1398.91100
author: Gerhard Jäger
published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication date: 2018-10-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 6955070
zbMATH Keywords: signaling games
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: costly signaling
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary stability
zbMATH Keywords: neutral stability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jtbi.2008.02.039
OpenAlex ID: W2152719518
Wikidata QID: Q81064687
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2008.02.039
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6955070