Stackelberg equilibrium in a dynamic stimulation model with complete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stackelberg equilibrium in a dynamic stimulation model with complete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1397.91109
DOI: 10.1134/S0005117918040112
published in: Automation and Remote Control
publication date: 2018-10-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 6957131
zbMATH Keywords: two-level incentive model
zbMATH Keywords: inverse Stackelberg game
zbMATH Keywords: discounted optimality criterion
zbMATH Keywords: Bellman equation
author: D. B. Rokhlin
author: Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0005117918040112
OpenAlex ID: W2798017576
Wikidata QID: Q129980471
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6957131