Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91121
author: Marco A. Janssen
author: Clint Bushman
published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication date: 2018-10-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 6959882
zbMATH Keywords: public good games
zbMATH Keywords: group selection
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jtbi.2008.06.017
OpenAlex ID: W2054446781
Wikidata QID: Q51952245
cites work: Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
cites work: Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
cites work: Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
cites work: The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2008.06.017
Recommended article: Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
Recommended article: Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations
Recommended article: The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
Recommended article: Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
Recommended article: An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
Recommended article: Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive
Recommended article: Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games
Recommended article: Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
Recommended article: Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6959882