Commitment in first-price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Commitment in first-price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1416.91143
author: Yunjian Xu
author: Katrina Ligett
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-10-23T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: CaltechAUTHORS:20160105-095011433
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 6962946
zbMATH Keywords: first-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: commitment
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg game
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2737172899
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-017-1069-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6962946