The stable \(b\)-matching polytope revisited
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The stable \(b\)-matching polytope revisited
zbMATH Open document ID: 1398.05164
author: Pavlos Eirinakis
author: Dimitrios Magos
author: Ioannis Mourtos
published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics
publication date: 2018-10-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 05C70
zbMATH DE Number: 6966410
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many stable matching
zbMATH Keywords: stable admissions
zbMATH Keywords: rotation poset
zbMATH Keywords: polytope
zbMATH Keywords: facet
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.dam.2018.05.030
OpenAlex ID: W2810072561
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DOI: 10.1016/J.DAM.2018.05.030
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6966410