On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0770.90009
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2
author: Ulrich Kamecke
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1993-06-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 219832
zbMATH Keywords: core of a linear assignment problem
zbMATH Keywords: continuum of allocations
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0304-4068(92)90024-2
OpenAlex ID: W2031699640
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Wikidata QID: Q127884720
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 219832