A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
zbMATH Open document ID: 0792.90021
author: Motty Perry
author: Philip J. Reny
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1993-06-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A55
zbMATH DE Number: 222132
zbMATH Keywords: Rubinstein's alternating-offers bargaining model
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1993.1004
OpenAlex ID: W2047232618
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1993.1004
Recommended article: A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining
Recommended article: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
Recommended article: Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
Recommended article: Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing
Recommended article: Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers
Recommended article: Q3975605
Recommended article: Nash solution and timing of bargaining
Recommended article: Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
Recommended article: Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
Recommended article: Stochastic bargaining models
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 222132