Commitment and observability in games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Commitment and observability in games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0821.90148
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80001-6
author: Kyle Bagwell
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1995-05-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 755366
zbMATH Keywords: models of commitment
zbMATH Keywords: first-mover advantage
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 755366