Protective behavior in matching models
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Protective behavior in matching models
zbMATH Open document ID: 0834.90003
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80002-8
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1996-04-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 755367
zbMATH Keywords: lexical maximin strategies
zbMATH Keywords: protective behavior
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching
zbMATH Keywords: mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: college-admissions model
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley-Shubik assignment model
author: Salvador Barberà
author: Bhaskar Dutta
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(05)80002-8
OpenAlex ID: W2094191344
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 755367