Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
zbMATH Open document ID: 1073.91515
author: Sandro Brusco
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-12-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1356425
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2546
OpenAlex ID: W2058266084
cites work: Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
cites work: Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
cites work: Game theory
cites work: Perfect sequential equilibrium
cites work: Bayesian Implementation
cites work: Subgame Perfect Implementation
cites work: Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2546
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1356425