Sensitive equilibria for ergodic stochastic games with countable state spaces
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sensitive equilibria for ergodic stochastic games with countable state spaces
zbMATH Open document ID: 0963.91011
published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
publication date: 2001-06-10T00:00:00Z
review text: The author considers stochastic games with countable state spaces, unbounded immediate payoff functions and some natural stochastic stability assumptions on the transition structure based on a recent work by \textit{S. P. Meyn} and \textit{R. L. Tweedie} [Ann. Appl. Prob. 4, 981--1011 (1994; Zbl 0812.60059)] and studies the existence of sensitive optimal strategies(overtaking or 1-optimality) in some classes of zero-sum stochastic games. The paper also contains a new equilibrium theorem for a class of ergodic non-zero sum stochastic games.
reviewed by: Samir Kumar Neogy
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 1356503
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic games
zbMATH Keywords: sensitive optimality
zbMATH Keywords: unbounded payoff
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
author: Andrzej S. Nowak
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001860050078
OpenAlex ID: W2006053863
DOI: 10.1007/S001860050078
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1356503