Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
zbMATH Open document ID: 0939.90010
author: David Martimort
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-11-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 1370326
zbMATH Keywords: multiple regulators
zbMATH Keywords: organizational choice
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg common agency game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2556
OpenAlex ID: W1975081812
cites work: Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
cites work: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
cites work: Common Agency
cites work: Arm's Length Relationships
cites work: Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
cites work: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
cites work: Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
cites work: Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
cites work: Oversight of Long-Term Investment by Short-Lived Regulators
cites work: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
cites work: Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2556
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1370326