Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1048.91023
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00011-X
author: Elchanan Ben-Porath
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-06-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1924602
zbMATH Keywords: communication
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian game
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1924602