Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
zbMATH Open document ID: 1032.91057
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00031-0
author: Jacob K. Goeree
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-06-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1924805
zbMATH Keywords: Auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Signaling
Wikidata QID: Q59938143
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1924805