Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1048.91026
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00546-8
author: Pradeep Dubey
author: Ori Haimanko
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-06-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A35
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1929322
zbMATH Keywords: subgame pefect equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: undominated sample size
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
cites work: Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
cites work: Q5583591
cites work: Q3272826
full work available at URL: s0899-8256(02)00546-8
OpenAlex ID: W2051988713
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929322