Strategic learning in games with symmetric information.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic learning in games with symmetric information.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1048.91022
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3
author: Olivier Gossner
author: Nicolas Vieille
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-06-17T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors study situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions; they characterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies when an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.
reviewed by: Mariano Ruiz Espejo
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1929323
zbMATH Keywords: Public value of information
zbMATH Keywords: Games with incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: Bandit problems
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(02)00535-3
OpenAlex ID: W2125378084
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929323