Hiding information in electoral competition.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Hiding information in electoral competition.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1048.91024
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00531-6
author: Paul Heidhues
author: Johan Lagerlöf
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-06-17T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors consider the model of an election with two candidates and one representative voter. A candidate can choose one of two policy alternatives: \(B\) (building a bridge) and \(N\) (not building a bridge). There are two states of the world \(\omega_B\) (the costs of the building will be modest) and \(\omega_N\) (building will be very costly). The voter wants the bridge to be built iff the costs will be modest. On the first step each candidate privately observes a signal about the true state \(\omega\) and then chooses an electoral platform \(x\in \{B, N\}\). The voter observes the candidates' chosen platforms \(x_1\) and \(x_2\) and then chooses for whom to vote. The equilibrium in this 3-person election game for various parameters of the problem (prior probability of the state, degree of correlation between private signals, etc.) is derived.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 1929324
zbMATH Keywords: information transmission
zbMATH Keywords: private signals
zbMATH Keywords: correlation
zbMATH Keywords: perfect Bayesian equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(02)00531-6
OpenAlex ID: W1990837819
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929324