Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1090.91027
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00019-X
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
author: John A. Weymark
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-06-18T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors consider an exchange economy with individual preferences having the classical properties (continuity, strict convexity (strict) monotonicity). It is shown that a strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee every agent a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This demonstrates that, given strategy-proofness, there is a conflict between efficiency and distributional goals.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 1930300
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: exchange economies
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00019-x
OpenAlex ID: W2145847323
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1930300