Informed trading and the `leakage' of information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Informed trading and the `leakage' of information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1031.91011
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00018-8
author: Aditya Goenka
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-06-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
zbMATH DE Number: 1930306
zbMATH Keywords: Informed trading
zbMATH Keywords: Strategic market games
zbMATH Keywords: Market microstructure
zbMATH Keywords: Information
zbMATH Keywords: revelation
zbMATH Keywords: Arrival of information
zbMATH Keywords: Market efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00018-8
OpenAlex ID: W1983690949
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1930306