An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
zbMATH Open document ID: 0858.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(94)00712-8
author: Sang-Chul Suh
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1997-03-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 940783
zbMATH Keywords: social choice correspondence
zbMATH Keywords: strong (Nash) implementation
zbMATH Keywords: Maskin monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: implementability of a correspondence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0304-4068(94)00712-8
OpenAlex ID: W1998673126
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 940783