Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 0858.90004
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213662
author: Dominique Lepelley
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1996-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 941182
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: constant scoring rule
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet winner criterion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3266133
cites work: Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
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cites work: The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
cites work: Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
cites work: Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
cites work: Geometry of voting
cites work: Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 941182