Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 0965.91025
author: François Maniquet
author: Yves Sprumont
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-12-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/455
review text: It is well known that the requirements of efficiency and strategy-proofness lead to dictatorship in two agent private good economies, and, more generally, conflict with anonymity when there are more than two agents. In the present setting of the problem efficiency and strategy-proofness do not conflict with anonymity. In a linear production model the authors characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allowed the authors to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.
reviewed by: Sergei Georgievich Zhuravlev
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B30
zbMATH DE Number: 1383314
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: linear production set
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2035123125
DOI: 10.1007/S001990050341
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1383314