Candidate behavior under mixed motives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Candidate behavior under mixed motives
zbMATH Open document ID: 0614.90005
DOI: 10.1007/BF00450996
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper presents a spatial election model in which candidates have mixed motives: They care both about winning and about the content of their platforms. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with what we observe empirically: some elections with convergent candidate positions, and some with divergent positions; the prevalence of elections in which the expected vote shares are not equal; candidates' positions reacting in part to those of their opponents; and candidates seeking a balance between what they believe and what they need to advocate to get elected.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3995383
zbMATH Keywords: spatial election
author: Douglas W. Mitchell
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3995383