Perfect sequential equilibrium
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Perfect sequential equilibrium
zbMATH Open document ID: 0616.90100
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0
author: Sanford J. Grossman
author: Motty Perry
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a ''metastrategy'' which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to evaluate how a game will evolve if new beliefs are assigned to a given node, and enables us to develop a restriction on the beliefs ''off the equilibrium path''. A perfect sequential equilibrium is supported by beliefs p which prevent a player from deviating to an unreached node, when there is no belief q which, when assigned to the node, makes it optimal for a deviation to occur with probability q.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 3999710
zbMATH Keywords: metastrategy
zbMATH Keywords: perfect sequential equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(86)90022-0
OpenAlex ID: W2048603811
Wikidata QID: Q29394326
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3999710