Core implementation via dynamic game forms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Core implementation via dynamic game forms
zbMATH Open document ID: 0679.90004
DOI: 10.1007/BF00295860
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The author proves a few theorems, concerning implementation of social choice correspondences. A few types of cores of the game (\(\alpha\)-core, \(\beta\)-core, strong equilibrium) and a notion of sequential dictatorship are considered. The theorems establish the conditions for which game implementation of social choice may be realized by the types of cores mentioned above only under the assumption of sequential dictatorship. As analytical tools the author used so-called effectivity functions and introduced new concepts pertaining to their properties.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4114340
zbMATH Keywords: implementation of social choice correspondences
zbMATH Keywords: \(\alpha\)-core
zbMATH Keywords: \(\beta\)- core
zbMATH Keywords: strong equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: sequential dictatorship
author: V. W. Kolpin
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q5817865
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cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4114340