Credible debate equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Credible debate equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 0681.90008
DOI: 10.1007/BF01832923
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D99
zbMATH DE Number: 4116253
zbMATH Keywords: political economics
zbMATH Keywords: credibility in debate
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous agenda setting game
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: transmission of information
author: David Austen-Smith
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4116253