Cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0681.90097
DOI: 10.1007/BF00939422
published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper addresses the problem of computation of cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games. The proposed approach contains as a special case the method of \textit{E. J. Green} and \textit{R. H. Porter} [Econometrica 52, 87-100 (1984; Zbl 0526.90013)] (developed originally for repeated oligopoly games), but it is more general than the latter in the sense that it generates nontrivial equilibrium solutions for a much larger class of dynamic games. This fact is demonstrated on two examples, one concerned with duopolistic economics and the other with fishery management.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 93B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A60
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C39
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90-08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 4116342
zbMATH Keywords: games with unobservable actions
zbMATH Keywords: computation of cooperative equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: discounted stochastic sequential games
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: duopolistic economics
zbMATH Keywords: fishery management
author: Alain Haurie
author: Boleslaw Tolwinski
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00939422
OpenAlex ID: W2041682247
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4116342