Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 0682.90006
DOI: 10.1007/BF01832918
author: Bezalel Peleg
author: Salvador Barberà
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 4118101
zbMATH Keywords: continuous preferences
zbMATH Keywords: nondictatorial voting schemes
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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cites work: Q4197570
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01832918
OpenAlex ID: W2064795175
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4118101